




The Case of Southern Senegal
Curtis M.Jolly
In spite of professional and political support for cooperatives in West Africa, their
record ofaccomplishments is very spotty. Advocates ofcooperatives have been blamed
for not tailoring the movement to the needs, social practices, and orientations oftradi-
tional societies. In this paper, an attempt is made to show how indigenous groups can
be organized to improve the coordination of traditional groups, local governments,
financial institutions, and aid donors. Village cooperatives, called "GroupementVillage-
ois," in southern Senegal were allowed to organize theirown business affairs. Credit was
provided to the cooperative group by the development agency. Cooperative activities
were structured around cultural norms, village traditions, and production systems,
rather than merely Rochdale principles. The village chief and elders were responsible
for linkages andcontacts withexternalentities. Thewhole village, and notjustindividual
members, was responsible for credit, marketing, and distribution. After two years of
operation, cooperative repayment of credit funds averaged 90 percent. Input use of
food crops had increased and member contributions to cooperative equity were on the
rise. Applications of this cooperative model were expanding rapidly throughout the
region.
Introduction
Scarcely a nation in the world, socialist or capitalist, exists that does not
utilize cooperatives (Anschel, Brannon, and Smith). Many ofthe most respected
students of economic development have placed heavy reliance upon coopera-
tives as instrumentsofeconomic reform (Schiller; Young, Sherman, and Rose).
Certain features ofthe Western model have been attractive to developingcoun-
tries whose goals include the equalitarian objectives of greater dispersion of
incomeand popularcontrolofeconomic institutions. Writers, like Schumacher,
Robert Owen, and Peter Kropotkin, major forbearers ofmodern cooperatives,
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resisted thealienation, exploitation,andabstractbureaucraticrelationshipsthey
associated with highly specialized societies (Cotterill). Agrarian socialists and
populists had similarconcernsandencouraged the organizationofcooperatives
as mechanisms ofdevelopment (Goodwyn). Therefore, cooperatives have been
recognized by many theorists as the only avenue through which farmer credit
and input distribution could be funneled in traditional communities (Anschel,
Brannon, and Smith; Adams). This paper shows how "traditional groups"
(locally functioning groups responsible for all village activities) can be success-
fully organized along cooperative lines for credit and input distribution.
In spite of professional and political support for cooperatives, their record
of performance has been spotty. In the post-World War II era, the Japanese
and Taiwanese (Chinese), are often pointed to as outstanding examples of
cooperativeaccomplishments. TheIsraelicooperativefarms (Moshav) havealso
been applauded (Abarbanel). Yet inothernations cooperative performance has
varied. In former British African territories the performance of cooperatives
has oscillated from year to year. In French West African territories where
cooperatives were forced onfarmers, success stories have been few. Cooperative
organizers have beenunabletomakecooperatives function successfully in many
developing countries. Cooperative advocates are now questioning whether the
western style cooperative model can be universally adopted.
The lifespan ofthe cooperative movement in many West African territories
has been relatively short. The reason given for cooperative failure in these
societies has been that cooperative advocates have not tailored the movement
to the needs, social practices, and orientations ofthe local people (Donald). As
Young, Sherman, and Rose have stated, the cooperative model as introduced
in many developing societies was alien to the cultures.
This paper attempts to show how indigenous groups can be organized to
improvecoordinationand performanceamongtraditional groups, government
offices, and donor agencies for economic development. A cooperative model of
a credit arrangement among local groups in the Ziguinchor region ofSenegal
demonstrates that successful cooperative business can be conducted without
strictly adhering to all principles of the international cooperative movement
(ICM).
The Concept ofa Cooperative
Thetermcooperative is applied to anyorganizednonprofitgrouporcommu-
nity agency. Vitaliano defined a cooperative as, "an economic organization
whose residual claims are restricted to the agent group that supplies patronage
under the organization's nexus of contracts (i.e., the member-patrons) and
whose board of directors is elected by the same group." Cotterill stated that
cooperativebusiness enterprisesaredistinguished from otherforms ofbusiness
organization primarily by the fact that their members considered other goals to
be more important than return on invested capital. Smith emphasized that the
definition of a cooperative poses a problem in isolating the contributions of
cooperatives to development. Cooperatives encompass formal and informal
community groups. Today's business cooperatives are much more structured,
because ofindustry, market, and management requirements, than those in the
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The Cooperative Movement in Senegal
Village cooperative organizations and groups have historically been part of
West African and Senegalese societies. Jolly, Maiga, and Gadbois reported that
in West African societies there were groups for young, old, female, and male
that conducted business on behalf of these groups. These communal groups
aresometimes referredto as cooperatives. Developmentagencies havesoughtto
organize production and consumption activities alongcooperative lines. Village
groups called "Groupement Villageois" (GP) have been organized to conduct
business relating to productionand consumption. These groupementvillageois
are informal types of cooperatives. The modern cooperative movement in
Senegal, however, has been very recent.
In the postindependence era, the governmentofSenegal made the coopera-
tive movement(CM) anintegralpartofits developmentplan. The philosophical
foundations were rooted in the national leadership's commitment to African
socialism as the official ideology ofthe regime. The CM was to become the basic
economic unit to mix the traditional African values ofsolidarity with modern
democratic principles. A circular issued by Dia in 1962 defined the basic goals
of the cooperative movement in Senegal.I
The CM experienced a certain degree of success in its early stages. Gellar
reported that during the sixties CM agents had organized hundreds of new
cooperative groups throughoutthecountry. By the endof 1960 there were 810
cooperative organizations serving more than 100,000 peasants. Early success
was shortlived due to several factors. An expanded program of agricultural
diversification heavily emphasized peanuts, the primary export crop. Buying
points were set for each group of cooperatives. Each buying point had to
serve as a marketing depot for all farmers belonging to the affiliated group of
cooperatives. The CM was also hampered by corruption, mismanagement,
paternalism of the state bureaucracy, illiteracy of the peasantry, and a variety
of external forces (Gellar).
Following a period of neglect the government made a second attempt to
revitalize the CM in the eighties. In 1983, Law 83-07 was passed (Decre). The
law spelled out the goals and structure of rural cooperatives by specifying
their constitutional form, membership characteristics, financial arrangements,
organizational and administrative characteristics, control, and ownership. The
Ministry of Rural Development was assigned responsibility for enforcing the
law. Two years after passage of Law 83-07, there was no significant change in
cooperative activities. Cooperatives remained marketing depots for cash crops
(primarily peanuts) and did not enhance production of cereal crops as was
anticipated. Jolly and Diop noted that the CM was responsible for less that 5
percent of cereal marketed during the 1983/84 agricultural season.
Critics of the Senegalese CM indicated that it was difficult to attain rural
development goals in Senegal with a movement that was organized around
principles alien to the people. The Senegalese CM's organizational and opera-
tional principles were based on the French Societe d'Interet CollectifAgricole.
Goals set by the CM were unrealistic and did not reflect the needs of the
peasantry. Gellar indicated that both advocates and critics of the CM agreed
that there was a huge gap between the cooperative ideals envisioned by the
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the CM. The functioning of the CM was made difficult because of conflicts
between the general principles of the international cooperative movement
(ICM) from which Senegalese CM was based and that of the rural community
groups or groupement villageois. The following discusses the conflicts between
the ICM principles (democratic control, voluntary membership, payments of
savings or surplus on the basis of patronage or volume of business done,
accounting principle, and education of members) and local traditions. It also
describes a model ofthe CM, incorporatinglocal traditions, and shows how the
model became functional.
Democratic Control
Democratic control implies that each cooperative member has equal rights or
is adequately represented in decision making. The principle of"one man, one
vote" is adhered to by many cooperatives abiding by the Rochdale principles.
Regardless of the form of national government in West African countries, at
the village level patriarchal headship is an important aspect ofpeasant societies
because they create "chains" of patron client relationships (Glickman). There
exists a multiplicity of such patriarchal arrangements that vary across ethnic
groups. Western-style democracies are uncommon in West Africa. Instead
governmentbureaucracies oversee communal village groups andare organized
according to racial, ethnic, or religious background.
IntheZiguinchorregionofSenegal, thevillage chieforhis appointee presides
over all meetings ofthe group. The chiefis assisted by a small group ofelders.
Each village member participates in village meetings and has inputintodecision
making, but the advisors or elders make the final decisions. The elders are
predominantly men. In such societies a "one man, one vote" system has little
chance ofacceptance. As Glickman indicates, "undersome conditions, commu-
nal pluralism may be conducive to the development of at least limited forms
ofdemocracy." In most cases ofcommunal pluralism, however, democracy can
operate only on a consociational rather than a majority rule basis. And even on
a consociational basis, it will often break down as a result ofsocial mobilization
that undermines the authority ofcommunity leaders, or as a result ofexternal
political or military intrusion.
Another factor is that the introduction of western-style democracy in West
African societies has been rendered even more difficult by the presence of
Islamic religious beliefs. As Huntingtonmentioned, Islam has notbeenhospita-
ble to democracy. Hefurtherstatedthatof36 countries with Moslem m<tiorities,
21 were rated "not free." Only Turkey among Arab countries has sustained
intermittent democracy since World War II. Senegalese society is heavily influ-
enced by Moslem and traditional beliefs. In the southern region communal
pluralism is dominant among village groups.
Voluntary Membership
The political culture of a society, which has been defined by Verba as "the
system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values, which defines the
situation in which the political action takes place," will determine the way mem-
bers ofthe society react to each otherand to their leaders. The political culture
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members. In traditional societies where patriarchal authority is valued, an indi-
vidual acts according to the dictates ofthe chiefand elders; ifnot, that person
is considered a rebel.
The principle of voluntary membership, for all who can use the services
and for those who are willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, is,
therefore, constrained by the political culture oftraditional societies. In many
indigenous societies an adult male may be unwilling to become a member of a
village group, but social and peer pressures will force him to reconsider his
decision. Once the adult male is initiated into thecommunity he is automatically
a member of all adult village organizations. Membership privileges could be
selective, but the individual can also be involuntarily enlisted in the group by
the council of elders. This is against the principle of voluntary participation.
Theunderlyingprincipleofvoluntary membershipis thatall membersshould
be ofthe same religious, social, and educational interest. According to Dobyns,
group members must have a certain degree of like-mindedness in order to
come together. Previous attempts at cooperative development have resorted to
attemptingto bringdifferentethnicgroups togetherinorderto gaineconomies
ofscale. As Cotterill suggests, larger cooperatives lead to economies and lower
average costs, within a relevant range, but often result in a deterioration of
social ecology within the cooperative causing the supply curve of voluntary
services to shift to the left. In Senegal the efforts to combine large and small
villages into cooperatives with 200 adult members have not been successful.
The difficulty encountered in merging members ofdifferentethnicgroups has
not been solved by offering pecuniary incentives.
Payment of Savings or Surplus on the Basis of Patronage or
Volume of Business Done
The small size of many cooperative groups in West Africa rarely permits
savings or surpluses. Whatever profits are made from business activities are
used according to the dictates ofthe chiefand the council ofelders. Whenever
surpluses accrue from transactions or from other cooperative activity such as
weeding or plowing the field of a wealthier villager, they are used for the
buildingofschools, dispensaries, and/orinfantnurseries. In manycooperatives
dividends paid to individual members are rare.
Marketingcooperativesorganizedby the MinistryofAgricultureareoperated
differently. Marketing cooperatives usually handle cash crops for export. Busi-
ness activities are conductedona nonpoolingbasis. A cooperativethatconducts
business based on the level ofmembership patronage is usually met with resis-
tance from the community.
Accounting Principle
One of the specific components ofan economic cooperative is its system of
accounting (Anschel, Brannon, and Smith). It is a key requirement in the
diffusion of this type of social organization (Hatta). Records are required to
measure cooperative efficiency and to reduce corruption. In countries with a
high level of illiteracy it is difficult to develop a proper accounting system. In
most of these countries there is a formal language in which domestic and
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percent of the adult population speak the official business language. Further-
more, in anyone region ofthe country, several dialects or languages are likely
to bespoken. Therefore, the establishmentofany formal business at the village
level that requires a complex accounting system is dependent on accountants
and bookkeepers who are fluent in both the official language and the vernacu-
lars of the region. Ifthe accountant or bookkeeper is not from the village, he
is not likely to be trusted with the villagers' finances. In many instances, where
extension agents or accountants from development agencies were allowed to
handle cooperative funds, the money and the agents often eventually disap-
peared.
Education of Members
All cooperatives are responsible for the educationoftheir members, officers,
employees, and the general public in the principles and techniques ofcoopera-
tion, both economic and democratic (Sargent). Education of the young has
always been a preoccupation of the adult members of traditional societies.
The type of education received by youth in a traditional society is broad and
encompasses the teachings ofthe history, traditions, and social organization of
the community. Members are trained to adopt the precepts and teachings of
the elders. Any type of local, social, or economic institution functions within
the context of the community. Every decision reflects community needs and
requirements. Teaching the precepts ofanyone ideology or that ofany single
group is subordinate to that of the community. The educational needs ofany
organization must fit into the principles and traditions of the community as
defined by the elders.
Development efforts through cooperatives have proven more difficult than
anticipated by most theorists (Bathrick). The difficulty encountered in theorga-
nization and implementationofthe CM in traditional societies has been embod-
ied in differences between the values and traditions of local cooperatives and
those proposed in the ICM. The elements ofthe ICM stem from the Rochdale
principles and have proven antagonistic to local traditions. Villagers in tradi-
tional societies prefer to work through indigenous groups rather than through
large organizations forced upon them by the state. The question is how can
formal business transactions be carried out successfully at regional and national
levels by many informal groups with varying ideologies?
In 1982 an attempt was made in southern Senegal to work with traditional
groups to increase agricultural production through making credit more avail-
able and through greater distribution ofproduction inputs. Inorder to achieve
success, a model had to be developed that would bridge the gap between local
groups, development agencies, and financial institutions. The model was in
operation for two years when a survey was conducted to determine its success.
Cooperative Credit Model
Themodel presentedin figure 1indicates theinvolvementofthe U.S. Agency
for InternationalDevelopment(USAID) inthecooperative project. Attheinitial
stage USAID provided seed money and technical assistance to the projectat the
regional level. The money was provided through the Banque Nationale pourSenegal Cooperativesljoily
Figure I.-Model of Cooperative Organization with Village-Level Groups
























Ie DeveloppementduSenegal (BNDS) (National DevelopmentBank) andmoni-
tored by accountants at USAID.
The first step was to extend credit to existing village groups called "Groupe-
ment Villageois" (GP) or to allow villagers to organize themselves into GPs.
Groupement Villageois or groupement producteurs are village-based groups
organized by villagers for various activities. These are activities related to
production and consumption. These groups are usually headed by the village
chieforhis appointee. Developmentagencies usethesegroupsintheirextension
effort. USAID or the rural development agency exerted no control over the8 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1991
internal organization of the GPs. The groups chose a spokesman who, with a
group of elders or councillors, represented the GP. All heads of households
were members of the GP either voluntarily or involuntarily. Each household
paid to the cooperative a retainer fee, used to cover the cost ofgroup business
activities, and a sum provided as a security deposit. This sum was used also to
pay for delinquent debts and factor costs not covered in the stated price of
inputs. At the beginning ofeach agricultural season the leaders and extension
agent surveyed members to estimate their credit worthiness and input require-
ments. All creditwas provided in the form ofinputs. Group membersdiscussed
theirestimatedrequirementswith the leaders.Joindy, theleadersandextension
agentevaluated thecredit requests made by members and determined whether
the individual's farm productivity and total farm activity were sufficient to
guarantee the loan. The criteria for making such decisions were never stated,
but the village councillors indicated that they knew the farmers well enough to
determine whether they were capable of loan repayment.
Theextensionagenthelpedthevillagers preparethedocumentationrequired
by the subregional director. A group of councillors and the extension agent
took all input requests to the regional director. The regional director presented
the total financial need request to USAID. USAID deposited an amount of
money at the national development bankto pay for the inputs. The BNDS then
ordered the inputs from a private manufacturingfirm or development agency.
When all financial arrangements were executed, transfer of ownership rights
of the inputs was made to the regional development agency from which they
were delivered to the subregional director. Local GPs made arrangements for
the collection and distribution ofthe inputs and ensured the reimbursementof
the credit. An agreement was made between USAID and the development
agency that village leaders were to enforce repaymentofthe creditand thatthe
members ofthe GP were responsible for theloan. They were informed thatthe
penalty for failure to repay 100 percent of a loan by the beginning of the
agricultural year was denial of credit from the GP for the following year.
The regional director returned the principal borrowed plus interest to the
development bank. This money served as a revolving fund for future loans.
USAID only funded additional monies ifcredit expansion was requested. The
rate of interest paid was decided by USAID and the development agency at a
level below the going rate, but about 2 percentage points above the government
subsidized rate for agricultural loans.
Results and Discussion
Farmers showed increased interest in the credit scheme. The GPs' contribu-
tion to cooperative funds from membership dues or retainer fees after two
years had increased by 1.5 million CFA ($1.00 U.S. = 300 CFA) after one year
of operation. In spite of the fact that membership was either voluntary or
involuntary, members were required to pay dues. Social pressure was the only
mechanism used to ensure payments of fees and debts. The reasons for
increased farmer participation in this group activity were that members felt
they were part of the organization and that their interests were being served.
Secondly, the terms of credit were partially dictated by members.
In the first year ofoperation (the 1983/84 agricultural season), only 5.25 tons
offertilizer (NPK, 8-18-27) and 14.3 tons ofurea were distributed (table 1). AtSenegal Cooperativesljolly 9
Table I.-Fertilizer Distribution and Credit Reimbursement of the
Groupement Villageois in Ziguinchor, Senegal, 1983/84-1984/85
Fertilizer Distributed Credit Reimbursement
1983/84 1984/85 1983/84 1984/85
NPK Urea NPK Urea Equipment Fertilizer Equipment Fertilizer
----------------------Tons----------------------
5.25 14.3 194.8 169.0
---------------------------Percent----------------------------
90.0 95.0 89.0 94.0
the beginning of the second year (the start ofthe 1984/85 agricultural season)
194.8 tons of NPK and 169.0 tons ofurea were distributed. It is important to
note that more than 55 percent ofthe fertilizer was used in cereal production.
Reasons for the increased use ofinputs on cereals are: no prerequisites ofcash
crop production were required to gain access to creditand secondly, the inputs
were heavily subsidized and even with low cereal prices farmers allocated
resources to cereals.
Credit repayment was high. Debt repaymenton loans for equipmentthe first
year was 90 percent, and for fertilizer 95 percent. By the end of the second
year, repayment on equipment was 89 percent and 94 percent for fertilizer.
Debt recuperation was very high when it is considered that in 1980 the rural
credit scheme that was managed by the Office Nationale de Commercialization
et d'Assistance au Developpement (ONCAD) had been abolished and the gov-
ernment had forgiven participants' debts, an action for which the government
of Senegal received much criticism.2 Delinquent payments of members were
paid for by the cooperative from retainer fees. This allowed the cooperative to
receive funding in subsequent years. The forgiveness of rural debt by the
government of Senegal reinforced a sense of dependence on the government
withintheruralcommunities.Therewas a feeling thatas longas thegovernment
provided credit, people would be unwilling to repay.
The cost ofoperating the credit scheme was low because administrative costs
were kept at the minimum. Input costs included transport to the subregional
office, interest, and administrative costs. Once the inputs arrived in the sub-
regional office, the GPs were responsible to truck the inputs to the village and
distribute them. In this model administrative costs were kept to the minimum
becauseadministrators were responsible for many other programs and the cost
of their services were spread over the several activities performed.
Debt recuperation is always a problemwhen farmers produceonly food crops
and few cash crops. It is difficult to recover debts from farmers who produce
only food crops not marketed through government channels. In this case, the
administrators lacking a financial history ofthe farmers could not tell who had
a good repayment record. However, the villagers knew the character of each
member and were able to apply social pressure on delinquents. In situations
like this, the only recourse for debt reimbursement is to make the entire village
responsible for a loan.10 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1991
Each group managed its own business transactions. The GP's structure and
identity remained intact, but it became partofa national and regional coopera-
tive credit scheme. The model enhanced flexibility because group differences
were recognized. Although this credit system worked, it is not known whether
other types of business transactions can be handled within this system unless
modifications are made in the GP's organizational structure. It must also be
remembered that the use of market interest rates would increase operational
cost and reduce membership participation. The extent to which membership
interest would fall is unknown. Itis known thatthe costofcapital in developing
countries can be above the market rate and individuals will pay that cost to be
liquid. In this case the subsidized rate at the development bank was 11 percent,
but members of GP were willing to pay 13 percent on borrowed capital. The
market rate during the same period was about 15 percent.
Summary and Conclusions
The model shows that local groups can participate in a cooperative credit
scheme without major disruption to the community social organization. The
principles of the ICM can be applied when necessary, but do not have to be
used to hinder cooperative activities. Local groups do not have to adhere to
strict democratic control. If the GP thinks the chiefand the elders can act and
represent the group, there is no reason for limiting business transactions if
some members are absent. The type ofdemocratic control remains an internal
affair. The other principle of voluntary membership must be decided by the
villagers. Problems stemming from lack ofan accounting system are mitigated
because the villagers are responsible for their funds. They have their own
techniques for calculating input needs and funds borrowed. They are further
assisted by extension agents who have some knowledge ofbookkeeping princi-
ples. Accounting records for all group activities are kept at the subregional and
regional offices. The model illustrates how cooperative activities can be carried
out in traditional societies without strict adherence to all ICM principles. This
does not mean that the model can be universally applied. However, it does
illustrate that flexibility in the use of ICM principles can enhance cooperative
success in traditional societies.
Notes
1. Gellar. Circulaire 32 revisited: "Prospects for Revitalizing the Senegalese Coopera-
tive Movement in the 1980's." Princeton University, and from Loi N° 83-07 dujanvier
1983 portant statut general des cooperatives du Senegal.
2. See note 1 above.
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